ABSTRACT

Scholarly attention to authoritarian legislatures is steadily growing, and recent research suggests that there is substantial lawmaking activity and deliberation within these bodies. Does such activity matter for legislators themselves? Can it improve their career prospects? I examine the career paths of Russian national legislators, using a newly collected data set on biographies and parliamentary performance of politicians who served in the Russian State Duma in 2004–2016. I find that members who apply more effort in legislative work are more likely to keep their parliamentary seats, but legislative effort does not increase the probability of executive appointment. Rather, legislators appear to be recruited into executive offices on the basis of previous work experience or personal ties. Parliamentary service, however, may still help legislators get ahead by making them more visible to government leadership. My research highlights that legislatures may be used by authoritarian governments to improve the management of political careers.

摘要

学术界对威权立法机构的关注正在稳步增长，最近的研究表明，这些机构内部有大量的立法活动和审议。这种活动对立法者本身有影响吗？它能改善他们的职业前景吗？我使用新收集的关于 2004 年至 2016 年在俄罗斯国家杜马任职的政治家的传记和议会表现的数据集，研究了俄罗斯国家立法者的职业道路。我发现在立法工作上付出更多努力的议员更有可能保住他们的议会席位，但立法努力并没有增加行政任命的可能性。相反，立法者似乎是根据以前的工作经验或个人关系被招募到行政办公室的。然而，议会服务，仍然可以通过让政府领导更容易看到立法者来帮助他们取得成功。我的研究强调，威权政府可能会利用立法机构来改善对政治生涯的管理。