Abstract

The 5–10 June 1967 Six Day War between Israel and Arab countries presented a new challenge for the competing U.S. and Soviet Union. Moscow, disturbed by the harm to its prestige and standing in the world following the humiliated defeat of its two main clients in the Middle East—Egypt and Syria—was determined to abolish Israel's territorial gains as quickly as possible. In contrast, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration considered Israel’s striking victory an American triumph as well and believed that Israeli withdrawal from the territories captured from the Arab countries prior to their recognizing Israel's right to exist in the Middle East would be interpreted as American surrender to Soviet pressure and could harm the United States’ stature around the globe. The Arab–Israeli conflict thus became a test case of the two superpowers’ determination and capability in safeguarding the interests of their respective Middle East clients. Still, both powers had a common interest in preventing further escalation between the Arabs and Israel, fearing that it risked dragging them into direct collision.

摘要

1967 年 6 月 5 日至 10 日，以色列和阿拉伯国家之间的六日战争对相互竞争的美国和苏联提出了新的挑战。在其在中东的两个主要客户——埃及和叙利亚惨败后，莫斯科对其声望和世界地位的损害感到不安，决心尽快取消以色列的领土收益。相比之下，林登·约翰逊总统的政府认为以色列的惊人胜利也是美国的胜利，并认为以色列在承认以色列在中东存在的权利之前从阿拉伯国家占领的领土撤出将被解释为美国投降苏联的压力，并可能损害美国在全球的地位。阿以冲突因此成为两个超级大国维护各自中东客户利益的决心和能力的考验。尽管如此，这两个大国在防止阿拉伯人和以色列之间的进一步升级方面有着共同的利益，担心这有可能将他们拖入直接冲突。