ABSTRACT

Causes must be distinct from their effects. If the temperature in a room is 15°F, this can cause water pipes to freeze. However, the temperature’s being 15°F is not a cause of the temperature’s being below the freezing point. In general, conceptual, logical, mathematical, and other non-causal dependence relations should not be misclassified as causal. In this paper, I discuss how interventionist theories of causation can meet the challenge of distinguishing between (direct or indirect) causal relations and dependence relations that are due to non-causal factors. I survey several approaches to solving this problem, and propose a novel criterion based on the notion of supervenience. According to this criterion, variables are sufficiently distinct to qualify as the relata of a causal relation iff they do not have overlapping minimal supervenience bases.

摘要

原因必须与其结果区分开来。如果房间内的温度为 15°F，这会导致水管结冰。但是，温度为 15°F 并不是温度低于冰点的原因。一般来说，概念、逻辑、数学和其他非因果依赖关系不应被错误分类为因果关系。在本文中，我讨论了因果关系的干预主义理论如何应对区分（直接或间接）因果关系和非因果因素引起的依赖关系的挑战。我调查了解决这个问题的几种方法，并提出了一种基于随附性概念的新标准。根据这个标准，变量足够不同以符合相关条件因果关系的前提是它们没有重叠的最小随附基础。