Abstract This paper examines the ways in which three external governance mechanisms, namely market preferences, institutional investors, and debtholder monitoring, influence dividend payout decisions under a family-governance system. We find that family firms issue lower dividends when the dividend premium is high in the market. Institutional investors and family-controlled governance mechanisms interact to increase dividend payouts. Family firms under greater debtholder monitoring pay out more cash to shareholders. Our findings generate important policy implications.

中文翻译：

---

家族控制、外部治理机制和股息支付

摘要 本文研究了市场偏好、机构投资者和债权人监督这三种外部治理机制如何影响家族治理体系下的股息支付决策。我们发现，当市场上的股息溢价较高时，家族企业会发行较低的股息。机构投资者和家族控制的治理机制相互作用以增加股息支付。在更严格的债权人监督下的家族企业向股东支付更多现金。我们的发现产生了重要的政策含义。