Review of International Political Economy ( IF 4.146 ) Pub Date : 2021-06-28 , DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2021.1924831 Marek Naczyk 1
Abstract
With rare exception, political economists assume that developmental policies and developmental alliances between states and business result from top-down, state co-option or coercion of business. They also do not expect the subsidiaries of multinational corporations (MNCs) and their local, non-expat, managers – the ‘compradors’ – to press for developmentalism in host countries. Based on process tracing of Polish economic policy since the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC), I argue that, in Poland’s dependent market economy and FDI-led growth regime, ‘comprador’ bankers co-opted state actors into renationalizing foreign-owned Polish banks and into reforming development institutions to support indigenous firms’ expansion. Moreover, comprador bankers operationalized new industrial policies for which state actors, indigenous entrepreneurs and ‘compradors’ simultaneously started pressing in the 2010s. Comprador bankers’ motives were their frustration at their weak managerial autonomy in foreign-headquartered MNCs and their concerns about the negative macro-economic implications of their parent banks’ attempts to capture their Polish subsidiaries’ excess liquidity during the GFC in order to improve their own liquidity positions.
中文翻译:
夺回控制权:波兰的买办银行家和管理发展主义
摘要
除了极少数例外,政治经济学家假设国家和企业之间的发展政策和发展联盟是自上而下、国家联合选择或企业胁迫的结果。他们也不期望跨国公司 (MNC) 的子公司及其当地的非外籍经理——“买办”——在东道国推动发展主义。基于对自 2008 年全球金融危机 (GFC) 以来波兰经济政策的进程追踪,我认为,在波兰依赖的市场经济和外国直接投资主导的增长体制中,“买办”银行家选择国家行为者将外资拥有的波兰银行重新国有化并改革发展机构以支持本土公司的扩张。此外,买办银行家实施了新的产业政策,国家行为者为这些政策、土著企业家和“买办”在 2010 年代同时开始施压。买办银行家的动机是他们对总部设在外国的跨国公司管理自主权薄弱感到沮丧,以及他们担心母银行在全球金融危机期间试图抓住波兰子公司的过剩流动性以改善自身的宏观经济影响。流动性头寸。