This paper studies the important problem of how to coordinate the capacity procurement model with asymmetric demand information. Under the model, the supplier has to secure necessary capacity before receiving a firm order from the manufacturer who possesses private demand information for her product. Optimal supply chain performance requires the manufacturer to share her forecast truthfully and the supplier to build enough capacity. In the literature, some elaborate contracts are designed to solve the problem. However, the authors prove that two simple conventional contracts (linear capacity reservation contract and payback agreement) can coordinate the supply chain and guarantee credible information sharing. Besides, the authors propose a new mechanism in which punishment is imposed in the payment function to bind the parties. To avoid punishment, the firms will choose the best decision for the entire supply chain. The contracts in this paper are all simple and easy to implement. The authors believe this work provides some insights to design coordination contracts in theory or in practice.

本文研究了如何在需求信息不对称的情况下协调产能采购模型的重要问题。在该模型下，供应商必须确保必要的产能才能从拥有其产品私人需求信息的制造商那里收到确定的订单。最佳供应链绩效要求制造商如实分享她的预测以及供应商建立足够的产能。在文献中，设计了一些精心设计的合约来解决这个问题。然而，作者证明了两个简单的常规合同（线性容量预留合同和回报协议）可以协调供应链并保证可信的信息共享。此外，作者提出了一种新的机制，在支付功能中施加惩罚以约束各方。为了逃避惩罚，公司将为整个供应链选择最佳决策。本文中的合约都是简单易行的。作者认为，这项工作为在理论或实践中设计协调合约提供了一些见解。