This paper studies the optimal payment policy offered by a regulator to a partially altruistic hospital when the latter privately observes the severity of illness of patients and chooses a hidden quality that influences the probability of medical complications occurring. We analyze how the level of altruism of the hospital affects the conditions under which the payment, for a given diagnosis-related group, should be refined according to the severity of illness and the occurrence of complications.

中文翻译：

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医疗并发症对最优住院支付的影响

本文研究了当部分利他医院私下观察患者病情严重程度并选择影响医疗并发症发生概率的隐藏质量时，监管机构向部分利他医院提供的最优支付政策。我们分析了医院的利他主义水平如何影响给定诊断相关组的支付条件，该条件应根据疾病的严重程度和并发症的发生情况进行细化。