Although partisan bias – when an authority transfers discretionary public resources to a politically aligned receiver − has been extensively studied, less is known about how this practice is affected by the voting regime − compulsory or voluntary voting. In this article, I study partisan bias in Chile, using administrative data of transfers from the central authority to local governments, highlighting two relevant scope conditions: the electoral cycle, and electoral uncertainty caused by the adoption of voluntary voting. I found strong evidence of partisan bias, especially in election years and in electorally riskier municipalities. This suggests that the uncertainty introduced by this electoral reform induced politicians to allocate a large share of resources to risky municipalities, because such resources would play a more significant role in the electoral outcome. Overall, these results imply that voluntary voting has a large impact on the way that resources are allocated across subnational units.

中文翻译：

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自愿投票会增强党派偏见吗？来自智利的证据

虽然党派偏见——当当局将可自由支配的公共资源转移给政治上一致的接受者——已被广泛研究，但人们对这种做法如何受到投票制度（强制或自愿投票）的影响知之甚少。在本文中，我研究了智利的党派偏见，使用中央政府向地方政府转移的行政数据，强调了两个相关的范围条件：选举周期和采用自愿投票导致的选举不确定性。我发现了党派偏见的有力证据，尤其是在选举年和选举风险较高的城市。这表明这次选举改革带来的不确定性促使政客将大部分资源分配给有风险的城市，因为这些资源将在选举结果中发挥更重要的作用。总体而言，这些结果表明自愿投票对跨地方单位的资源分配方式有很大影响。