Within the context of managerial reporting, the tasks of acquiring and reporting information are logically connected. Although the accounting literature acknowledges their importance, it often treats these tasks as distinct processes. I investigate how the effort exerted to acquire information influences managers' reporting. Managers' information acquisition effort can induce psychological ownership that can lead to a sense of deservingness that increases opportunistic reporting or to a sense of responsibility that reduces opportunism. I predict that the reporting context determines the ultimate effect of information acquisition effort on reporting behavior. I test this prediction with a 2×2 budget reporting experiment. Managers are either endowed with information to report or required to exert effort to earn it, with the latter expected to generate more psychological ownership. In addition, I manipulate the saliency of honesty in the reporting context by framing reporting in terms of a business dilemma (less salient honesty) or an ethical dilemma (more salient honesty). I find that when honesty is less salient, managers build more slack into their report under earned information than endowed information. In contrast, more salient honesty alleviates the effect of earned information on slack. In a supplemental experiment, I find similar results when all managers are endowed with information to report but psychological ownership is manipulated via different firm messaging. These results have important implications for theory and practice. For example, in a less salient honesty context, technological investments that reduce managers' effort needed to acquire information can also help decrease opportunistic reporting.

中文翻译：

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信息获取努力、心理所有权和报告背景对机会管理报告的影响*

在管理报告的背景下，获取和报告信息的任务在逻辑上是相互关联的。尽管会计文献承认它们的重要性，但它通常将这些任务视为不同的过程。我调查了为获取信息所付出的努力如何影响管理者的报告。管理者的信息获取努力可以诱发心理所有权，这可能导致增加机会主义报告的应得感或减少机会主义的责任感。我预测报告环境决定了信息获取工作对报告行为的最终影响。我用一个 2×2 预算报告实验来测试这个预测。管理者要么被赋予要报告的信息，要么被要求努力获得信息，后者预计会产生更多的心理所有权。此外，我通过根据业务困境（不那么突出的诚实）或道德困境（更突出的诚实）来构建报告，从而在报告环境中操纵诚实的显着性。我发现，当诚实不那么突出时，经理们在获得的信息而不是赋予的信息下在他们的报告中建立了更多的松弛度。相比之下，更突出的诚实减轻了获得信息对松弛的影响。在一个补充实验中，我发现当所有经理都被赋予要报告的信息但心理所有权被不同的公司信息操纵时，我发现了类似的结果。这些结果对理论和实践具有重要意义。例如，在不那么突出的诚实背景下，降低管理人员的技术投资