What should advocates of phenomenal intentionality say about unconscious intentional states? I approach this question by focusing on a recent debate between Tim Crane and David Pitt, about the nature of belief. Crane argues that beliefs are never conscious. Pitt, concerned that the phenomenal intentionality thesis coupled with a commitment to beliefs as essentially unconscious embroils Crane in positing unconscious phenomenology, counter-argues that beliefs are essentially conscious. I examine and rebut Crane’s arguments for the essential unconsciousness of beliefs, some of which are widely endorsed. On the way I sketch a model of how belief states could participate in the stream of consciousness. I then consider Pitt’s position, arguing in reply, along Freudian lines, that we should posit not just dispositional but occurrent unconscious beliefs. This result, I argue, indeed requires advocates of phenomenal intentionality to posit unconscious qualia to fix these unconscious occurrent thoughts, and I defend the coherence of the notion of unconscious qualia against some common attacks. Ultimately, I claim, the combination of taking seriously the occurrent unconscious, and a commitment to phenomenal intentionality, should lead us to expand William James’s conception of the stream of consciousness to encompass, additionally, a stream of unconscious mental life—or, perhaps better, to posit a single partly conscious partly unconscious qualia-stream of mental goings-on.

现象意向性的拥护者应该如何看待无意识的意向状态？我通过关注蒂姆·克兰 (Tim Crane) 和大卫·皮特 (David Pitt) 最近关于信仰本质的辩论来解决这个问题。克兰认为，信念从来都不是有意识的。皮特担心现象意向性论题加上对基本无意识的信念的承诺使克莱恩卷入无意识现象学的假设，反驳说信念本质上是有意识的。我检查并反驳了克莱恩关于信仰的基本无意识的论点，其中一些得到了广泛的认可。在路上，我勾勒出一个关于信念状态如何参与意识流的模型。然后，我考虑了皮特的立场，按照弗洛伊德的思路，作​​为回应，我认为我们不仅应该假设性格，而且还应该假设发生的无意识信念。我认为，这个结果确实需要现象意向性的拥护者设定无意识品质来解决这些无意识发生的想法，并且我捍卫无意识品质概念对一些常见攻击的一致性。最终，我声称，认真对待发生的无意识和对现象意向性的承诺，应该引导我们扩展威廉詹姆斯的意识流概念，以包含另外的无意识精神生活流——或者，也许更好，假设一个单一的部分有意识部分无意识的心理活动的质量流。我捍卫无意识感受性概念对一些常见攻击的一致性。最终，我声称，认真对待发生的无意识和对现象意向性的承诺，应该引导我们扩展威廉詹姆斯的意识流概念，以包含另外的无意识精神生活流——或者，也许更好，假设一个单一的部分有意识部分无意识的心理活动的质量流。我捍卫无意识感受性概念对一些常见攻击的一致性。最终，我声称，认真对待发生的无意识和对现象意向性的承诺，应该引导我们扩展威廉詹姆斯的意识流概念，以包含另外的无意识精神生活流——或者，也许更好，假设一个单一的部分有意识部分无意识的心理活动的质量流。