In this paper, I analyze the effectiveness of different capital regulations in mitigating the effects of moral hazard that exists only for systemically important banks. Leverage restrictions have the potential to reduce the fraction of banks that are systemically important but do not mitigate moral hazard for those that are. Risk adjusted requirements could mitigate moral hazard (of banks with low leverage) but do not affect (endogenous) systemic risk. A combination of both requirements as proposed by the Basel III framework can be successful, although only under restrictive conditions.

中文翻译：

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道德风险下的杠杆和风险承担

在本文中，我分析了不同资本监管在减轻仅存在于具有系统重要性的银行的道德风险影响方面的有效性。杠杆限制有可能减少具有系统重要性的银行的比例，但不能减轻那些具有系统重要性的银行的道德风险。风险调整后的要求可以减轻（低杠杆银行的）道德风险，但不会影响（内生）系统性风险。巴塞尔协议 III 框架提出的两种要求的结合可能会成功，但仅限于限制性条件。