In most countries, self-financed accumulation of capital in cooperative enterprises makes substantial (but variable) use of indivisible reserves, which can be understood as common-pool capital resources, since they are characterized by rivalry and non-excludability in utilization among the members of the cooperative. The paper is structured in two main parts. The first part deals with dynamic inefficiency in investments and the problem of undercapitalization due to the members’ truncated temporal horizon in worker cooperatives. The conjugation of different types of reserves, divisible and indivisible, is envisaged as possible solution to under-investment. In the second part, a new layered system of reserve funds, both divisible and indivisible, is discussed, showing that each different layer has distinctive functions in facing the stability vs performance trade-off: stability and strength of patrimony are adjudicated to the indivisible layers, while efficient allocation of reinvested funds and members’ financial involvement require divisible reserve layers.

在大多数国家，合作企业的自筹资金积累大量（但可变）地使用了不可分割的储备，可以将其理解为共同池资本资源，因为它们的特点是成员之间在使用方面具有竞争性和非排他性合作社的。本文的结构分为两个主要部分。第一部分涉及投资的动态低效率和由于成员在工人合作社中被截断的时间范围而导致的资本不足问题。可分割和不可分割的不同类型储备的结合被视为投资不足的可能解决方案。在第二部分中，讨论了一种新的可分割和不可分割的储备基金分层系统，