Armed conflict in Colombia with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP) was only settled after fifty years and several attempts at negotiations. This sequence of events fits the pattern of “conflict ripeness” first proposed by William Zartman. But using a successful settlement as a way to determine ripeness can be tautological. To address this issue, we develop a formal model to identify the level of ripeness at which a conflict is settled. In an overripe conflict both parties end up spending resources in a military build-up that is out of proportion with what they obtain in the final settlement. We show that such overripeness is exacerbated by the access to resources and by the factional heterogeneity within the two sides. We illustrate these dynamics by looking in detail at the attempts at negotiation between Colombia’s government and the FARC-EP. To that end, we combine statistical data, some previously undisclosed, and interviews with some key participants.

哥伦比亚与哥伦比亚革命武装力量 (FARC-EP) 的武装冲突在经过五十年和多次谈判尝试后才得到解决。这一系列事件符合威廉·扎特曼首先提出的“冲突成熟”模式。但是使用成功的结算作为确定成熟度的方法可能是同义反复。为了解决这个问题，我们开发了一个正式的模型来识别级别解决冲突的成熟期。在一场过于成熟的冲突中，双方最终都会在军事集结上花费资源，而这与他们在最终解决方案中获得的资源不成比例。我们表明，资源的获取和双方内部的派系异质性加剧了这种过度成熟。我们通过详细研究哥伦比亚政府与 FARC-EP 之间的谈判尝试来说明这些动态。为此，我们结合了统计数据、一些以前未公开的数据以及对一些关键参与者的采访。