According to the fitting attitude (FA) analysis of value concepts, to conceive of an object as having a given value is to conceive of it as being such that a certain evaluative attitude taken towards it would be fitting. Among the challenges that this analysis has to face, two are especially pressing. The first is a psychological challenge: the FA analysis must call upon attitudes that shed light on our value concepts while not presupposing the mastery of these concepts. The second challenge is normative: the FA analysis must account for the fittingness of the relevant attitudes in terms of a kind of normativity intimately related to these attitudes, but again without presupposing the mastery of the relevant value concepts. In this paper, we show that real progress is possible if we pay close attention to the nature of the attitudes recruited by the analysis. More specifically, we claim that an FA analysis that appeals to emotions conceived as evaluative attitudes — as opposed to, for instance, evaluative judgements or evaluative perceptions — has the best prospects of meeting the two challenges and of putting the FA analysis on a strong footing.

中文翻译：

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哪些态度适合价值观的态度分析？

根据价值概念的拟合态度（FA）分析，将对象设想为具有给定的价值，就是将其设想为对它采取的某种评价态度是合适的。在此分析必须面临的挑战中，有两个挑战尤为紧迫。第一个是心理挑战：FA 分析必须呼吁能够阐明我们的价值概念的态度，而不是以掌握这些概念为先决条件。第二个挑战是规范性的：FA 分析必须根据一种与这些态度密切相关的规范性来解释相关态度的适用性，但同样不以掌握相关价值概念为前提。在本文中，我们表明，如果我们密切关注分析所产生的态度的性质，真正的进步是可能的。更具体地说，我们声称，吸引被视为评价态度的情绪的 FA 分析 - 与例如评价性判断或评价性认知相反 - 最有可能应对这两个挑战并为 FA 分析奠定坚实的基础.