Do economic incentives explain forced displacement during conflict? This paper examines this question in Colombia, which has had one of the world’s most acute situations of internal displacement associated with conflict. Using data on the price of bananas along with data on historical levels of production, I find that price increases generate more forced displacement in municipalities more suitable to produce this good. However, I also show that this effect is concentrated in the period in which paramilitary power and operations reached an all-time peak. Additional evidence shows that land concentration among the rich has increased substantially in districts that produce these goods. These findings are consistent with extensive qualitative evidence that documents the link between economic interests and local political actors who collude with illegal armed groups to forcibly displace locals and appropriate their land, especially in areas with more informal land tenure systems, like those where bananas are grown more frequently.

经济激励是否可以解释冲突期间被迫流离失所？本文在哥伦比亚探讨了这个问题，哥伦比亚是世界上最严重的与冲突相关的国内流离失所情况之一。使用香蕉价格数据和历史生产水平数据，我发现价格上涨会导致更适合生产这种商品的城市被迫流离失所。然而，我也表明，这种影响集中在准军事力量和行动达到历史高峰的时期。其他证据表明，在生产这些商品的地区，富人的土地集中度大幅增加。