Rorty holds that it is possible to defend a liberal democratic policy without having to substantiate it according to universal criteria linked to corresponding notions of truth, instead, he affirms that this democratic policy can be founded on a notion of truth narrowly linked to justification. Following this idea one would expect Rorty to take a position committed to pluralism understood in a strong sense, where different positions are justified and validated in relation to specific existential conditions, however, this does not happen. As we will demonstrate, Rorty´s proposal, although it is partly inspired by Nietzsche´s perspectivism, as well as the ethical-political reading of plurality based on Wittgenstein´s proposal of language games, it goes no further than a contextualized pretence which is not based on a real posture of pluralism. In this article we maintain that the Rortian position, far from being pluralist, tends toward ethno-centrism and even domination through persuasion.

罗蒂认为，捍卫自由民主政策是可能的，而不必根据与相应真理概念相关的普遍标准来证实它，相反，他肯定，这种民主政策可以建立在与正当性狭义相关的真理概念之上。遵循这个想法，人们会期望罗蒂采取一种致力于在强烈意义上理解的多元主义的立场，在这种立场上，不同的立场在特定的存在条件下是合理的和有效的，然而，这并没有发生。正如我们将要证明的，罗蒂的提议虽然部分受到尼采的透视主义以及基于维特根斯坦的语言游戏提议的多元化的伦理政治解读的启发，但它只不过是一个情境化的伪装，不是基于多元主义的真实姿态。