In this paper, I propose a tractable model of sovereign default and the inter-state spillovers emanating from default. A coalition of nations may choose to insure against default, and the behavior of the coalition is used to examine the magnitude of the international spillovers. A voting structure for the coalition is proposed to examine idiosyncratic spillovers. The model is calibrated to the recent Greek Debt crisis to understand the spillovers from a default, and the moral hazard effect of the Troika. I find that spillover effects are large. If the rest of the world defaulted, this would create a loss equivalent to a permanent 9% decrease in government spending. Counterfactual experiments reveal that default would be prevalent without the IMF, suggesting that the own-penalty to defaulting has decreased since the IMF’s creation.

在本文中，我提出了一个易于处理的主权违约模型和违约产生的国家间溢出效应。一个国家联盟可以选择为违约投保，联盟的行为被用来检查国际溢出的程度。建议联盟的投票结构来检查特殊的溢出效应。该模型针对最近的希腊债务危机进行了校准，以了解违约的溢出效应以及三驾马车的道德风险效应。我发现溢出效应很大。如果世界其他地区违约，这将造成相当于政府支出永久性减少 9% 的损失。反事实实验表明，如果没有 IMF，违约将普遍存在，这表明自 IMF 成立以来，自身对违约的惩罚已经减少。