In The Visible and the Invisible Merleau-Ponty develops a notion of ‘sensible ideas’ that conceives general meaning as inseparable from its realization in sensible particulars. Such ideas – exemplified by music – are to capture the specificity of the meaning produced by embodied agency and serve as the foundation of all cognition. This article argues that, although Merleau-Ponty overgeneralizes their application, sensible ideas are philosophically important in enabling better understanding of the diverse forms and functions embodied-embedded practices and cognition can take. It begins by outlining Merleau-Ponty’s conception of sensible ideas and showing how this late ‘ontological’ view takes up and refines themes from his earlier works. It then assesses sensible ideas’ assumed foundational role by considering several embodied practices (mathematics, music, painting), arguing that this does not hold generally and that painting better exemplifies sensible ideas than music. I show that whether a practice is accurately described by sensible ideas depends on how it relates the particular and general, and that sensible ideas have a distinctive philosophical role in understanding the non-identity-based meaning constitution characteristic of some embodied-embedded practices. Finally, a comparison with Kant’s aesthetic ideas is used to clarify the close but non-necessary relation between sensible ideas and art.

在可见与不可见梅洛-庞蒂发展了一种“感性观念”的概念，该概念认为一般意义与其在感性细节中的实现密不可分。这样的想法——以音乐为例——是为了捕捉由具身能动性产生的意义的特殊性，并作为所有认知的基础。本文认为，尽管梅洛-庞蒂过度概括了它们的应用，但明智的想法在哲学上很重要，可以更好地理解具身嵌入的实践和认知可以采取的各种形式和功能。它首先概述了梅洛-庞蒂的感性观念的概念，并展示了这种晚期的“本体论”观点如何从他的早期作品中汲取和提炼主题。然后，它通过考虑几种具体化的实践（数学、音乐、绘画）来评估合理的想法假定的基础作用，认为这并不普遍，绘画比音乐更能体现明智的想法。我表明，一种实践是否被感性观念准确描述取决于它如何关联特殊和一般，并且感性观念在理解某些具身嵌入实践的非基于身份的意义构成特征方面具有独特的哲学作用。最后，通过与康德美学思想的比较，阐明感性思想与艺术之间的密切而非必然的联系。并且在理解某些具身嵌入实践的非基于身份的意义构成特征方面，感性观念具有独特的哲学作用。最后，通过与康德美学思想的比较，阐明感性思想与艺术之间的密切而非必然的联系。并且在理解某些具身嵌入实践的非基于身份的意义构成特征方面，感性观念具有独特的哲学作用。最后，通过与康德美学思想的比较，阐明感性思想与艺术之间的密切而非必然的联系。