This article analyzes the institutions, procedures, and mechanisms of non-judicial rights review in Germany, focusing on the policy field of national security. Although there is currently a fruitful constitutional debate about the virtues and vices of non-judicial review in the Anglo-Saxon legal world, this debate has virtually gone unnoticed in German scholarship, and the role of political actors in protecting fundamental rights is neglected. This article studies how rights considerations affect the making of antiterrorism policy in Germany and what mechanisms exist in the legislative process to ensure the creation of rights-respecting antiterrorism policy. It is methodologically designed as a case study and focuses on two controversial pieces of legislation: the Data Retention Act and the Anti-Terror Database Act. The article reveals that Germany features a bureaucratic model of rights review in which rights issues are primarily negotiated between the two constitutional ministries—the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior—which are mutually entangled in an institutionalized competitive relationship. This model complements the German strong-form model of judicial review and has the effect that the role of rights is mostly mediated through the Constitutional Court’s case law and the prospect of judicial review. The article further demonstrates that these non-judicial rights-review processes are surrounded by a legalistic and rather formalistic political culture that is not conducive to a principled and deliberative engagement with fundamental rights. Overall, rights are prominently considered and clearly have a constraining effect, however, often ultimately recede when weighed against the objective of ensuring collective security in the wake of the threat of terrorism.

中文翻译：

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反恐政策的非司法权利审查：基本权利在德国反恐数据库和数据保留立法中的作用

本文分析了德国非司法权利审查的制度、程序和机制，重点关注国家安全的政策领域。尽管目前在盎格鲁-撒克逊法律界就非司法审查的优点和缺点进行了富有成果的宪法辩论，但这场辩论在德国学术界几乎没有被注意到，政治行为者在保护基本权利方面的作用也被忽视了。本文研究了权利考虑如何影响德国反恐政策的制定，以及立法过程中存在哪些机制来确保制定尊重权利的反恐政策。它在方法上被设计为一个案例研究，重点关注两项有争议的立法：《数据保留法》和《反恐数据库法》。文章揭示了德国的权利审查官僚模式，在这种模式下，权利问题主要在两个宪法部门——司法部和内政部——之间进行​​谈判，这两个部门相互纠缠在一种制度化的竞争关系中。这一模式补充了德国司法审查的强式模式，其效果是权利的作用主要通过宪法法院的判例法和司法审查的前景来调解。本文进一步表明，这些非司法性的权利审查过程被一种法律主义和相当形式主义的政治文化所包围，这种文化不利于对基本权利进行有原则的和慎重的参与。总体而言，权利得到了突出的考虑，并且显然具有约束作用，但是，