This study examines the impact of SEC enforcement actions on the turnovers of culpable CEOs and CFOs named in the enforcement actions, following their violations of the SOX provisions. We compare the impact on CEO turnover with that on CFO turnover. The impact in the pre-SOX period and that in the post-SOX period are also compared. Findings of this study provide evidence that the SEC enforcement actions are associated with the probabilities of turnovers of CEOs and CFOs named in the SEC enforcement actions for violations of SOX 303 and SOX 305. Specifically, CEOs sanctioned by the SEC are likely to lose their positions when they violate SOX 305. In contrast, CFOs sanctioned by the SEC for violating SOX 303 are likely to be forced to resign. When CFOs are named as mastermind by the SEC, they are likely to lose jobs. However, when both CEO and CFO are named as masterminds in fraudulent financial reporting, CFOs are less likely to be removed. In addition, CEOs and CFOs are likely to lose their jobs when firms face bankruptcy and restate earnings and when they face criminal charges, especially in the post-SOX period.

本研究调查了 SEC 执法行动对执法行动中指定的有罪 CEO 和 CFO 在违反 SOX 规定后离职的影响。我们比较了对 CEO 更替和 CFO 更替的影响。还比较了前 SOX 时期和后 SOX 时期的影响。本研究的结果提供证据表明，SEC 执法行动与 SEC 执法行动中任命的 CEO 和 CFO 因违反 SOX 303 和 SOX 305 的离职概率有关。具体而言，被 SEC 制裁的 CEO 可能会失去职位当他们违反 SOX 305 时。相比之下，因违反 SOX 303 被美国证券交易委员会制裁的首席财务官可能会被迫辞职。当 CFO 被 SEC 任命为策划者时，他们很可能会失业。然而，当 CEO 和 CFO 都被任命为欺诈性财务报告的策划者时，CFO 不太可能被免职。此外，当公司面临破产和重报收益以及面临刑事指控时，尤其是在后 SOX 时代，CEO 和 CFO 可能会失业。