We examine a timing game with complete information and observable actions when there is a second-mover advantage. Allowing for heterogenous payoffs between players and for both leader and follower payoff functions to be multi-peaked and non-monotonic, we develop a new solution method to characterize the pure-strategy equilibria. Sometimes these resemble familiar second-mover advantage equilibria from the literature. However, we show, despite a follower advantage at all times for both players, that there can be a preemption equilibrium. Our generic solution method can be applied to a range of applications, such as market entry, innovation and holdout games for rival sellers of complementary assets.

当有后发优势时，我们研究了具有完整信息和可观察动作的计时游戏。允许参与者之间的异质收益以及领导者和追随者的收益函数都是多峰和非单调的，我们开发了一种新的解决方案方法来表征纯策略均衡。有时，这些类似于文献中熟悉的后发优势均衡。然而，我们表明，尽管双方在任何时候都具有追随者优势，但仍可能存在抢占均衡。我们的通用解决方案方法可以应用于一系列应用，例如市场进入、创新和针对互补资产的竞争对手卖家的坚持游戏。