Climate change is an underlying cause of many extreme events such as enormous cyclones and erratic torrential rains. These phenomena threaten farmers in coastal regions of Myanmar. Self-insurance through means such as crop diversification is insufficient for sustainable farm management. Weather index insurance (WII) is receiving much attention because of its low management costs. An optimum WII contract for flood damage using rainfall as the index has been proposed for rice farmers in coastal regions. According to the model, an insurance payment demand function is derived by solving the expected utility maximization problem. The utility function of the contract is specified as constant relative risk aversion type. The production function is specified as Cobb–Douglas type. By substituting real average data of rice production of farmers into this function, the optimum insurance payment and premium are obtained. Changes in insurance compensation by payments according to an increase in the price of rice, rainfall, and degree of risk aversion are investigated. Results suggest that if an average farmer pays around 41.5 US dollars per year, then farm management will be optimally stabilized under the flood risk.

气候变化是许多极端事件的根本原因，例如巨大的气旋和不稳定的暴雨。这些现象威胁到缅甸沿海地区的农民。通过作物多样化等方式进行自我保险不足以实现可持续的农场管理。天气指数保险（WII）因其低管理成本而备受关注。已经为沿海地区的稻农提出了以降雨为指标的最佳 WII 洪水灾害合同。根据该模型，通过求解期望效用最大化问题，推导出保险赔付需求函数。合约的效用函数被指定为常数相对风险厌恶类型。生产函数指定为 Cobb-Douglas 型。通过将农民水稻生产的真实平均数据代入该函数，得到最优的保险支付和保费。调查了根据稻米价格、降雨量和风险规避程度的增加而支付的保险赔偿金的变化。结果表明，如果平均农民每年支付约 41.5 美元，那么农场管理将在洪水风险下得到最佳稳定。