We analyze a model of binary choice by a committee, when information is hard and pre-voting deliberation is allowed. Each member has, independently of the others, a positive probability of getting a private signal about the true state; with the remaining probability the member is uninformed. Hard information means that lying is disallowed during deliberation—informed members can reveal publicly or hide their signals, while uninformed voters have to disclose their ignorance. We allow non-consequentialist members whose thresholds for switching to the non-status-quo action vary with the number of informative signals. We show that in general, committee members will never reveal information fully during deliberation, even when we rule out partisan types who want the same action in all states. In particular, unanimity rule performs no worse than other rules.

我们分析了一个委员会的二元选择模型，当信息很难并且允许投票前审议时。每个成员独立于其他成员，获得有关真实状态的私人信号的概率为正；剩余的概率该成员是不知情的。硬信息意味着在审议过程中不允许撒谎——知情的成员可以公开透露或隐藏他们的信号，而不知情的选民则必须揭露他们的无知。我们允许非结果主义成员切换到非现状行动的阈值随信息信号的数量而变化。我们表明，一般而言，委员会成员在审议期间永远不会完全透露信息，即使我们排除了希望在所有州采取相同行动的党派类型。特别是，