ABSTRACT

If reactions to Nozick’s experience machine reveal a pervasive reluctance to choose a pleasurable virtual life over humdrum reality, that may indicate that most people are not intuitively hedonistic. However, recent work argues that popular reactions to his vignette fail to show this, due to various factors that confound people’s intuitions. Survey results on alternative experience machine scenarios cast doubt on Nozick’s assumption that most people are antagonistic to hedonism. Some surveys even show a majority endorsing a modified experience machine. Does this imply that a majority of people are open to hedonism? I argue not. Nozick’s experience machine and its variants all fail to effectively target hedonism because they offer more than mere pleasure – they offer a rich experiential life of manifold opportunities, possibly including opportunities to pursue non-hedonistic goals, such as truth, beauty or philosophy. As an alternative, I propose the Universal Pure Pleasure Machine, which avoids the pitfalls of other thought experiments and provides a more targeted probe of intuitions toward hedonism. Experimental evidence reveals a widespread rejection of this hedonistic fantasy. This bolsters Nozick’s assumption that most people are not satisfied with hedonism, thus supporting his argument that hedonism is a deficient theory of value.

摘要

如果对诺齐克体验机器的反应表明他们普遍不愿意选择愉快的虚拟生活而不是单调的现实，这可能表明大多数人在直觉上并不是享乐主义的。然而，最近的工作认为，由于混淆了人们的直觉的各种因素，大众对他的小插图的反应未能表明这一点。对替代体验机器场景的调查结果对诺齐克关于大多数人反对享乐主义的假设提出了质疑。一些调查甚至显示，大多数人都赞同改进后的体验机。这是否意味着大多数人对享乐主义持开放态度？我不争辩。诺齐克的体验机器及其变体都未能有效地针对享乐主义，因为它们提供的不仅仅是快乐——它们提供了多种机会的丰富体验生活，可能包括追求非享乐主义目标的机会，例如真理、美或哲学。作为替代方案，我提出了通用纯粹快乐机器，它避免了其他思想实验的陷阱，并提供了对享乐主义直觉的更有针对性的探索。实验证据表明，人们普遍拒绝这种享乐主义的幻想。这支持了诺齐克的假设，即大多数人不满足于享乐主义，从而支持他的论点，即享乐主义是一种有缺陷的价值理论。实验证据表明，人们普遍拒绝这种享乐主义的幻想。这支持了诺齐克的假设，即大多数人不满足于享乐主义，从而支持他的论点，即享乐主义是一种有缺陷的价值理论。实验证据表明，人们普遍拒绝这种享乐主义的幻想。这支持了诺齐克的假设，即大多数人不满足于享乐主义，从而支持他的论点，即享乐主义是一种有缺陷的价值理论。