There is a tendency in contemporary (analytic) aesthetics to considerably restrict the scope of things that can be beautiful or ugly. This peculiarly modern tendency is holding back progress in aesthetics and robbing it of its potential contribution to other domains of inquiry. One view that has suffered neglect as a result of this tendency is the moral beauty view, whereby the moral virtues are beautiful and the moral vices are ugly. This neglect stems from an assumption to the effect that virtues and vices simply cannot be beautiful or ugly. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it develops an account of form, under which, it argues, possession of form suffices for an object’s candidature for beauty and ugliness. Second, it argues that, under the foregoing proposal, the moral beauty view turns out to be a coherent position, and so should be taken seriously in both aesthetics and ethics.

中文翻译：

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论形式，以及道德美的可能性

当代（分析）美学有一种趋势，即极大地限制事物的范围，可以是美的，也可以是丑的。这种独特的现代趋势阻碍了美学的进步，并剥夺了它对其他研究领域的潜在贡献。由于这种倾向而被忽视的一种观点是道德美观，即道德美德是美的，道德恶是丑陋的。这种忽视源于一种假设，即美德和恶习根本不可能是美的或丑的。本文的目的是双重的。首先，它发展了一种对形式的解释，在这种解释下，它认为，拥有形式就足以作为一个对象的美与丑的候选资格。其次，它认为，在上述提议下，道德美观是一个连贯的立场，