We examine whether revealing misreporting affects the careers of executives and independent directors. To isolate the effects of revealing misreporting from the underlying malfeasance, we analyze executives and directors who joined firms after stock option backdating ceased, but who were in place to determine how the firm would respond to the unfolding backdating crisis. Overall, these new executives and directors faced career penalties at firms that issued a backdating restatement relative to those at firms that remained silent despite strong evidence of backdating having occurred. We conduct a variety of tests to rule out alternative explanations, and conclude that new executives and directors face career penalties after firms reveal misreporting.

我们研究披露误报是否会影响高管和独立董事的职业生涯。为了将披露误报的影响与潜在的渎职行为隔离开来，我们分析了在股票期权追溯停止后加入公司的高管和董事，但他们已经到位，以确定公司将如何应对正在发生的追溯危机。总体而言，这些新高管和董事在发布追溯重述的公司面临职业处罚，相对于那些尽管有确凿证据已经发生但仍然保持沉默的公司。我们进行了各种测试以排除其他解释，并得出结论，新高管和董事在公司披露误报后将面临职业处罚。