The past decade has profoundly reshaped the fiscal governance system of the Eurozone. Supranational prerogatives vis-à-vis State budgets have been significantly expanded, thereby redefining the nature of Union action in the field of fiscal policy and transforming the dynamics between the Union and its Member States. In spite of its overhaul and the practical effects that Eurozone fiscal governance now produces on the ground, the paper shows that overall, this regulatory system still formally qualifies as soft law. This results in a deep disconnect between the form and substance of Eurozone fiscal surveillance in the Eurozone, which raises a number of constitutional challenges. The paper shows that the source of this disconnect is to be found in the strict apprehension of the hard law/soft law divide and the narrow understanding of bindingness attached to it, which currently prevails in the legal discipline, but no longer corresponds to the realities of the EU’s regulatory practice. From there on, the paper offers an alternative approach towards the distinction between hard and soft law, based on a renewed, more open and contextual, understanding of the concepts of bindingness and legal effects, which might reconcile the form and the reality of Eurozone fiscal governance nowadays.

过去十年深刻地重塑了欧元区的财政治理体系。相对于国家预算的超国家特权已显着扩大，从而重新定义了联盟在财政政策领域行动的性质，并改变了联盟与其成员国之间的动态。尽管欧元区财政治理进行了全面改革并产生了实际效果，但该文件表明，总体而言，该监管体系在形式上仍属于软法。这导致欧元区的欧元区财政监督的形式和实质严重脱节，从而引发了一系列宪法挑战。该论文表明，这种脱节的根源在于对硬法/软法鸿沟的严格理解以及对其所附约束力的狭隘理解，目前在法律学科中盛行，但不再符合现实。欧盟的监管实践。从那时起，本文基于对约束力和法律效力概念的更新、更开放和上下文的理解，提供了一种区分硬法和软法的替代方法，这可能会调和欧元区财政的形式和现实。当今的治理。