This paper presents data from a survey leading up to the 2016 US presidential elections. Participants were asked their opinions about the candidates and were also asked to vote according to three alternative voting rules, in addition to plurality: approval voting, range voting, and instant runoff voting. The participants were split into two groups, one facing a set of four candidates (Clinton, Trump, Johnson, and Stein) and the other a set of nine candidates (the previous four plus Sanders, Cruz, McMullin, Bloomberg, and Castle). The paper studies three issues: (1) How do US voters use these alternative rules? (2) What kinds of candidates, in terms of individual preferences, are favored by which rule? (3) Which rules empirically satisfy the independence of eliminated alternatives? Our results provide evidence that, according to all standard criteria computed on individual preferences, be there utilitarian or of the Condorcet type, the same candidate (Sanders) wins. Evaluative voting rules such as approval voting and range voting might lead to this outcome, contrary to direct plurality and instant runoff voting (that elects Clinton) and to the official voting rule (that elected Trump).

本文介绍了 2016 年美国总统大选前的一项调查数据。参与者被问及他们对候选人的看法，并被要求根据三个替代投票规则投票，除了多数：批准投票、范围投票和即时决选投票。参与者被分成两组，一组面对一组四名候选人（克林顿、特朗普、约翰逊和斯坦），另一组面对九名候选人（前四名加上桑德斯、克鲁兹、麦克马林、布隆伯格和卡斯尔）。该论文研究了三个问题：（1）美国选民如何使用这些替代规则？(2) 就个人偏好而言，什么样的候选人更受哪个规则的青睐？(3) 哪些规则在经验上满足被淘汰选项的独立性？我们的结果提供了证据表明，根据根据个人偏好计算的所有标准标准，无论是功利主义者还是孔多塞类型，同一候选人（桑德斯）都会获胜。与直接多数和即时决选投票（选举克林顿）和官方投票规则（选举特朗普）相反，支持投票和范围投票等评估性投票规则可能会导致这种结果。