Imperfect information is widely acknowledged to hamper the adoption of energy efficient technologies. In this paper, we study supply-side implications of the associated incentive structure. We build on existing evidence suggesting that energy efficiency owns a credence component, whereby the supply side of the market has more information about what technology is best for consumers. The literature on credence goods markets suggests that informational advantage by an expert-seller leads to market inefficiencies, including low trade volume. We start by developing a simple framework to study supply-side incentives related to the provision of energy efficient technologies. We then document inefficiencies and potential remedies by discussing linkages between an empirical literature on credence goods and that on the market for energy efficiency. Doing so, we identify policy implications and research gaps that are relevant for the adoption of energy efficiency technologies.

中文翻译：

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能效市场信息不对称：来自 Credence Good 文献的见解

众所周知，不完美的信息会阻碍节能技术的采用。在本文中，我们研究了相关激励结构的供给侧影响。我们以现有证据为基础，表明能源效率具有可信度的组成部分，由此市场的供应方可以了解更多关于哪种技术最适合消费者的信息。关于信用商品市场的文献表明，专家卖家的信息优势会导致市场效率低下，包括低贸易量。我们首先开发一个简单的框架来研究与提供节能技术相关的供应方激励措施。然后，我们通过讨论信用商品的实证文献与能源效率市场上的实证文献之间的联系来记录低效率和潜在的补救措施。这样做，