ABSTRACT

One of the outcomes of the 2014 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit held in Wales was the recommendation that allies should strive towards spending at least 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on military expenditure by 2024. This has in recent years put the debate on burden sharing within the Alliance in the limelight. Within the Alliance, the interpretation of the guidelines is different. This is partly because the U.S.A, especially under President Trump, has consistently viewed the 2-% guideline as a binding agreement. Some allies have, however, indicated that their military expenditure will not increase to the recommended threshold by the set deadline. Critics of the guideline have also identified several shortfalls associated with it and consequently dismissed it. Those who support it emphasize for instance that it contributes to addressing grievances about free riding within the Alliance. This paper contributes to this discussion and literature on demand for military expenditure by assessing how NATO’s two percent guideline can be viewed from a demand for military expenditure perspective. It also proposes and estimates a dynamic panel model for this purpose. Empirical evidence presented suggests that fiscal conditions require attention in the debate on the two percent guideline.

摘要

2014 年在威尔士举行的北大西洋公约组织 (NATO) 峰会的成果之一是建议盟国应努力争取到 2024 年将其国内生产总值 (GDP) 的至少 2% 用于军费开支。这在近年来使联盟内部关于分担负担的辩论成为焦点。在联盟内部，对准则的解释是不同的。这部分是因为美国，尤其是在特朗普总统的领导下，一直将 2% 的指导方针视为具有约束力的协议。然而，一些盟国表示，他们的军费开支不会在规定的期限内增加到建议的门槛。该指南的批评者还发现了与其相关的几个不足之处，因此将其驳回。例如，支持它的人强调，它有助于解决联盟内部对搭便车的不满。本文通过评估如何从军事支出需求的角度看待北约的 2% 指导方针，为有关军事支出需求的讨论和文献做出了贡献。为此，它还提出并估计了一个动态面板模型。所提供的经验证据表明，财政状况需要在关于 2% 指导方针的辩论中予以关注。为此，它还提出并估计了一个动态面板模型。所提供的经验证据表明，财政状况需要在关于 2% 指导方针的辩论中予以关注。为此，它还提出并估计了一个动态面板模型。所提供的经验证据表明，财政状况需要在关于 2% 指导方针的辩论中予以关注。