当前位置: X-MOL 学术Canadian Journal of Philosophy › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Group Agents and Moral Status: What Can We Owe to Organizations?
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-06-18 , DOI: 10.1017/can.2021.8
Adam Lovett , Stefan Riedener

Organizations have neither a right to vote nor a right to life. But we can owe them to keep our promises or show them gratitude. So we owe some things to organizations, but not everything we owe to people. What explains this? Individualistic views explain it just in terms of features of organizations’ individual members. Collectivistic views explain it just in terms of features of those organizations. Neither view works. Instead, we need to synthesize these approaches. Some individual interests are distinctively collective. Individuals have an interest in participating in successful collective action. This explains organizations’ apparently fragmented moral status.

中文翻译:

团体代理人和道德地位:我们可以对组织做出什么贡献?

组织既没有投票权,也没有生命权。但我们可以欠他们遵守我们的承诺或向他们表示感谢。所以我们欠组织的一些东西,但不是我们欠人的一切。这是什么解释?个人主义观点只是根据组织的个体成员的特征来解释它。集体主义观点只是根据这些组织的特征来解释它。两种观点都不起作用。相反,我们需要综合这些方法。一些个人利益具有独特的集体性。个人有兴趣参与成功的集体行动。这解释了组织明显支离破碎的道德地位。
更新日期:2021-06-18
down
wechat
bug