We study a dynamic game in which a financial expert seeks to optimize the utilization of her private information either by information disclosure to an investor or by self-use. The investor may be aligned or biased: an aligned investor always cooperates with the expert, whereas a biased investor may strategically betray the expert. We characterize the joint dynamics of the expert's information disclosure and the investor's type revelation and show that, by disclosing her information gradually, the expert can alleviate the hold-up effect exerted by the biased investor. Moreover, we show that the equilibrium of this game is unique. We also examine how the expert can further increase the value of her information by committing to a deadline or by committing to a particular schedule of information disclosure.

我们研究了一个动态博弈，在这个博弈中，金融专家通过向投资者披露信息或通过自我使用来寻求优化其私人信息的利用。投资者可能是一致的或有偏见的：一致的投资者总是与专家合作，而有偏见的投资者可能会战略性地背叛专家。我们刻画了专家信息披露和投资者类型披露的联合动态，并表明，通过逐步披露专家信息，专家可以减轻有偏见的投资者施加的拖延效应。此外，我们证明了这个博弈的均衡是唯一的。我们还研究了专家如何通过承诺截止日期或承诺特定的信息披露时间表来进一步增加其信息的价值。