ABSTRACT In the software industry, early release or delayed release are important decisions for the competing software vendors in the presence of the word-of-mouth (WOM) effect. This paper explores the optimal release decisions of two competing software vendors in two periods according to their estimations about WOM generated by their products. We find that in most scenarios, the firm expecting to have advantaged WOM adopts what is called an early-release strategy, whereas the firm expecting to have disadvantaged WOM adopts a delayed-release strategy. Of interest, when one firm’s expected WOM is sufficiently disadvantaged, it will also adopt an early-release strategy as long as the competitor’s expected WOM is sufficiently advantaged, which will never occur in a monopoly setting. When both firms’ expected WOM are negative and not too small, a counterintuitive equilibrium may appear in which the firm expecting to have disadvantaged WOM adopts the early-release strategy and the other expecting to have advantaged WOM adopts the delayed-release strategy. Two firms will be caught in a prisoner’s dilemma in the duopoly market when both adopt the delayed-release strategy and the difference between the two firms’ expected WOM is sufficiently small. As the market growth rate increases (decreases), competitive firms are more likely to adopt the delayed-release strategy (early-release strategy). Further, compared with the optimal strategy in a monopoly setting, a software vendor is more likely to adopt an early-release strategy in the competition setting, and the probability of adopting an early-release strategy will be higher as the intensity of competition becomes stronger. Firms’ interests and the social planner’s interest can be aligned under certain conditions, but this is not always the case. Finally, we examine the firms’ optimal release strategies and quality design strategies when we assume a specific functional relationship between WOM and consumer requirement uncertainty and product quality.

中文翻译：

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基于口碑效应的竞争软件厂商最优发布策略

摘要 在软件行业，在存在口碑效应的情况下，提前发布或延迟发布是竞争软件供应商的重要决策。本文根据两个竞争软件供应商对其产品产生的 WOM 的估计，探讨了两个竞争软件供应商在两个时期的最佳发布决策。我们发现，在大多数情况下，期望获得口碑优势的公司采用所谓的提前发布策略，而期望获得口碑劣势的公司采用延迟发布策略。有趣的是，当一家公司的预期口碑充分处于劣势时，只要竞争对手的预期口碑足够优势，它也会采取提前释放策略，这在垄断环境中永远不会发生。当两家公司的预期 WOM 为负且不太小时，可能会出现一种违反直觉的均衡，即期望获得 WOM 劣势的公司采用提前发布策略，而另一个期望获得 WOM 优势的公司采用延迟发布策略。当两个公司都采用延迟释放策略并且两个公司的预期WOM之间的差异足够小时，这两个公司将在双头垄断市场中陷入囚徒困境。随着市场增长率的上升（下降），竞争企业更有可能采用延迟释放策略（early-release strategy）。此外，与垄断环境下的最优策略相比，软件供应商在竞争环境中更可能采用提前发布策略，并且随着竞争强度的增强，采用提前发布策略的概率会更高。 . 在某些条件下，企业的利益和社会计划者的利益可以保持一致，但情况并非总是如此。最后，当我们假设口碑与消费者需求不确定性和产品质量之间存在特定的函数关系时，我们检查了公司的最佳发布策略和质量设计策略。