In the transition to democracy some autocracies transformed to republics while others evolved to constitutional monarchies. The paper inquires how constitutional monarchy is established. It models a hereditary king and a liberal challenger who coexist over a succession of periods and fight for power which brings office rents and the right to decide one’s preferred policy. The outcome of the confrontation is uncertain and may vary from period to period. If the king wins, he establishes absolute monarchy, but if the liberal wins he establishes a republic. Instead of fighting they may agree on a constitutional monarchy and share office rents and policy making responsibilities. Whether constitutional monarchy is agreed depends on the marginal utilities from rents and policy preferences of the two actors, the sizes of the benefits from rents and policy, the rates by which they discount the future, and the probabilities of winning office. The contemporary European constitutional monarch as a ceremonial head of state who reigns but does not govern arises as a special case of the general model.

在向民主过渡的过程中，一些专制政体转变为共和制，而另一些则演变为君主立宪制。本文探究君主立宪制是如何建立的。它塑造了一个世袭国王和一个自由挑战者，他们在一系列时期共存并为权力而战，这带来了办公室租金和决定个人偏好政策的权利。对抗的结果是不确定的，可能会因时期而异。如果国王获胜，他建立绝对君主制，但如果自由派获胜，他建立共和国。他们可能会同意建立君主立宪制并分担办公室租金和政策制定责任，而不是战斗。是否同意君主立宪取决于两个参与者的租金和政策偏好的边际效用，租金和政策的收益大小，他们对未来的贴现率，以及赢得职位的概率。当代欧洲君主立宪制作为国家元首的礼仪性统治者而不是统治者，是作为一般模式的一个特例而出现的。