We study how overlapping ownership affects investments in a preemption race with market uncertainty. Internalization of rival payoffs delays follower entry if product market effects are moderate, implying longer incumbency which intensifies the race to lead. Preemptive and follower investment thresholds increase with volatility as in standard real option models but firm value can decrease, and greater volatility makes internalization more profitable. From a welfare perspective there is a tradeoff between a dynamic benefit and a static cost of overlapping ownership. Whereas it is socially optimal not to have any overlapping ownership in some markets, at low volatility levels we find firms have an insufficient incentive to internalize.

我们研究重叠所有权如何在市场不确定的抢占竞赛中影响投资。如果产品市场效应适中，竞争对手回报的内部化会延迟追随者进入，这意味着更长的在职时间会加剧领先竞争。与标准实物期权模型一样，先发制人和跟随者投资阈值随着波动性增加，但公司价值可能会下降，而更大的波动性使内部化更有利可图。从福利的角度来看，动态收益和重叠所有权的静态成本之间存在权衡。虽然在某些市场上不存在任何重叠的所有权是社会最优的，但在低波动水平下，我们发现公司内部化的动力不足。