What drives organizational nonconformity to global corporate governance norms? Despite the prevalence of such norms and attendant conformity pressures, many firms do not adhere to them. We build on a political view of corporate governance to explore how different national institutional contexts and organizational conditions combine to produce over- and underconformity to global board independence norms. Using configurational analyses and data from banks in OECD countries, we identify multiple equifinal combinations of conditions associated with over- and underconformity. We also find that over- and underconformity have different drivers. We conjecture that while overconformity is associated with a shareholder–management coalition in liberal market economies, underconformity results from multiple complex combinations of national and organizational conditions that often include dominant blockholders, strong labor rights, and small organizational size. We leverage these findings to abduct theoretical insights on nonconformity to global corporate governance norms. Doing so sheds light on the role of power in conditioning the adoption of global practices and contributes to research on international corporate governance by informing discourse surrounding the globalization of markets.

是什么导致组织不符合全球公司治理规范？尽管此类规范盛行并伴随着合规压力，但许多公司并未遵守这些规范。我们以公司治理的政治观点为基础，探索不同的国家制度背景和组织条件如何结合起来，导致对全球董事会独立性规范的过度和不符合。使用来自经合组织国家银行的配置分析和数据，我们确定了与过度和不符合相关的条件的多种等最终组合。我们还发现过度整合和不整合有不同的驱动因素。我们推测，虽然过度从众与自由市场经济中的股东管理联盟有关，不合规是国家和组织条件的多种复杂组合的结果，这些条件通常包括占主导地位的大股东、强大的劳工权利和较小的组织规模。我们利用这些发现来推断关于不符合全球公司治理规范的理论见解。这样做揭示了权力在调节全球实践采用方面的作用，并通过为围绕市场全球化的讨论提供信息来促进国际公司治理的研究。