In this paper, I try to facilitate the understanding of the concept of ‘omniscience’ by taking into account the terminology developed in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. Thus, I start by explaining why omniscience can be regarded neither as grounded knowledge nor as ungrounded or objective certainty. Instead, omniscience might be considered as subjective certainty, which has the advantage of leaving scope for a doubt that enables and strengthens religious faith. Lastly, I clarify how God’s omniscience would be enriched if He were informed of—without needing to share—our objective certainties, in addition to which I highlight two paradoxes that would arise if we disagreed with God regarding some of our objective certainties. These paradoxes reveal that even though the believer could not understand literally God’s statement, it might strengthen her faith if she realized and accepted that a true and consistent commitment to such statement entails the suspension of her own capacity for judgment.

在本文中，我试图通过考虑路德维希·维特根斯坦 (Ludwig Wittgenstein) 的《论确定性》中开发的术语来促进对“全知”概念的理解. 因此，我首先解释为什么全知既不能被视为有根据的知识，也不能被视为无根据或客观的确定性。相反，无所不知可能被视为主观确定性，它的优点是可以留下怀疑的余地，从而支持和加强宗教信仰。最后，我澄清了如果上帝被告知——无需分享——我们的客观确定性，他的无所不知将如何变得丰富，此外，我强调如果我们在某些客观确定性上不同意上帝，就会出现两个悖论。这些悖论表明，即使信徒不能从字面上理解上帝的陈述，但如果她意识到并接受对这种陈述的真实和始终如一的承诺需要暂停她自己的判断能力，这可能会增强她的信心。