This article models the interaction of key factors missed in most accounts of Supreme Court decision making -- that is, the interaction of the rules of authorship (chief and senior justice authorship rights), authorship utility (in terms of justice reputation, and the chief justice’s legacy), and the constraint of legal doctrines. We model how (1) the chief justices and senior median justices compete for case authorship and have incentives to vote for policy outcomes they do not prefer in order to gain authorship control of the Court’s opinion (and the added reputation and legacy utility that comes with authorship), and (2) legal doctrines may enhance or restrict such behavior. We illustrate the model through a stylized account of the Supreme Court’s 2012 “Obamacare” decision where the deciding vote of Chief Justice Roberts to uphold Obamacare (along with his authorship of the opinion), and the dissenting vote of Justice Kennedy to repeal Obamacare, follow the implications of our model rather than the counter expectations of Supreme Court experts and commentators at the time. The model has implications for interpreting justice voting and authorship behavior and how the design of legal doctrines influence the justices’ votes and opinion authorship.

本文模拟了大多数最高法院决策中遗漏的关键因素的相互作用——即作者身份规则（首席和高级法官的署名权）、署名效用（就司法声誉而言，以及首席法官）之间的相互作用。正义的遗产），以及法律学说的约束。我们模拟 (1) 首席大法官和中位高级大法官如何竞争案件作者身份，并有动力投票支持他们不喜欢的政策结果，以获得对法院意见的作者身份控制权（以及随之而来的额外声誉和遗产效用）作者身份），以及（2）法律原则可能会增强或限制这种行为。我们通过对最高法院 2012 年“奥巴马医改”决定的程式化描述来说明该模型，其中首席大法官罗伯茨决定性投票支持奥巴马医改（连同他的意见作者），以及肯尼迪大法官对废除奥巴马医改的反对票，请遵循我们模型的含义，而不是当时最高法院专家和评论员的相反期望。该模型对解释正义投票和作者行为以及法律学说的设计如何影响法官的投票和意见作者具有影响。