Abstract This study empirically examines whether mandatory audit fee disclosure affects audit pricing and price competition in the private client segment of the Belgian audit market. We expect price competition between auditors to intensify after mandatory public disclosure of audit fees because transparency of audit fee information is likely to increase client bargaining power and/or increase competitive pressure. Using a data set including both pre- and post-disclosure audit fees of private clients, we observe that subsequent to mandatory disclosure of audit fees, clients with positive (negative) abnormal audit fees experience a downward (upward) fee adjustment. Consistent with increased price competition following mandatory audit fee disclosure, clients with negative abnormal audit fees are better able to mitigate the upward fee adjustment if they have higher bargaining power or have an auditor facing stronger competitive pressure. These effects are largest in the initial disclosure year, suggesting anticipatory price adjusting behavior by audit firms.

中文翻译：

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比利时审计市场私人客户部分的强制性审计费用披露和价格竞争

摘要 本研究实证检验了强制性审计费用披露是否影响比利时审计市场私人客户部分的审计定价和价格竞争。我们预计审计费用强制公开披露后审计师之间的价格竞争将加剧，因为审计费用信息的透明度可能会增加客户的议价能力和/或增加竞争压力。使用包括私人客户披露前和披露后审计费用的数据集，我们观察到在强制披露审计费用之后，具有正（负）异常审计费用的客户经历了向下（向上）的费用调整。与强制性审计费用披露后价格竞争加剧相一致，如果客户具有较高的议价能力或审计师面临更大的竞争压力，则异常审计费用为负的客户能够更好地缓解费用上调。这些影响在初始披露年度最大，表明审计公司的预期价格调整行为。