In his Outlines of Pyrrhonism 2.110–113, Sextus Empiricus presents four different accounts of the conditional, presumably all from the Hellenistic period, in increasing logical strength. While the interpretation and provenance of the first three accounts is relatively secure, the fourth account has perplexed and frustrated interpreters for decades or longer. Most interpreters have ultimately taken a dismissive attitude towards the fourth account and discounted it as being of both little historical and logical interest. We argue that this attitude is unwarranted and demonstrate that the conditional expressed in the fourth account can profitably be understood as a precursor of analytic entailment, familiar from containment logics such as those developed by Parry and Angell. Exploiting recent work by Fine, we present a formal truthmaker semantics for this conditional and show how it sheds light on a number of longstanding issues in the interpretation of this passage.

中文翻译：

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Sextus Empiricus 的第四个条件和包含逻辑

在他的 Pyrrhonism 大纲 2.110-113 中，Sextus Empiricus 提出了四种不同的条件式解释，大概都来自希腊化时期，增加了逻辑强度。虽然前三个帐户的解释和出处相对安全，但第四个帐户已经使解释者困惑和沮丧了几十年或更长时间。大多数解释者最终对第四个叙述采取了不屑一顾的态度，认为它既没有历史意义又没有逻辑意义。我们认为这种态度是没有根据的，并证明第四个说明中表达的条件可以有利地理解为分析蕴涵的先驱，这与 Parry 和 Angell 开发的包含逻辑很相似。利用 Fine 最近的工作，