The present paper aims to show that the reconstruction of the formal framework of the proofs in Pr. An. 1.15, as proposed by Malink and Rosen 2013 (‘Proof by Assumption of the Possible in Prior Analytics 1.15’, Mind, 122, 953-85) is due to affront a double impasse. Malink and Rosen argue convincingly that Aristotle operates with two different modal frameworks, one as found in the system of modal logic presented in Prior Analytics 1.3 and 8-22, and one occurring in many of Aristotle’s works, such as the Physics, De Caelo and the Metaphysics. However, they misconstrue the latter framework. More precisely, they misconstrue the domain of significance of what they call the ‘Principle of Necessitation’. As a consequence, bringing the two frameworks into one results into a contradictory modal logic. On the other hand, if the Principle of Necessitation is rectified, the proofs put forward by Malink and Rosen in the same paper are no longer available.

中文翻译：

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先前分析中可能性的假设证明，1.15；如何不混合模态框架

本文旨在展示Pr中证明的形式框架的重建。一个。1.15，正如 Malink 和 Rosen 2013 年提出的（'Proof by Assumption of the possible in Prior Analytics 1.15', Mind, 122, 953-85）是由于冒犯了双重僵局。马林克和罗森令人信服地争辩说，亚里士多德使用两种不同的模态框架，一种见于先验分析 1.3 和 8-22 中提出的模态逻辑系统，另一种出现在亚里士多德的许多著作中，例如物理学、德卡埃洛和形而上学。然而，他们误解了后一个框架。更准确地说，他们误解了他们所谓的“必然性原则”的意义领域。因此，将两个框架合二为一会导致矛盾的模态逻辑。另一方面，