The World Trade Organization cannot deal comprehensively with restrictive export practices maintained by energy cartels such as the OPEC. The main reason for this is the absence of competition rules in the multilateral trading system. However, in spite of the fact that the WTO does not have rules on competition, it does provide for other rules, such as GATT Article XI on the General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions. This article will take a law and economics approach and explore whether restrictive practices in the energy sector as maintained by OPEC could be caught by this article. It will analyse whether OPEC’s ‘monopolist market power instrument of choice’, namely the administration of production quota on petroleum, could fall within the definition of this Article. To this end, this contribution aims to understand the economic and legal rationales and functioning of both the WTO and OPEC.

中文翻译：

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世贸组织法律和经济学以及能源贸易中的限制性做法：欧佩克卡特尔案例

世界贸易组织无法全面处理石油输出国组织等能源卡特尔维持的限制性出口做法。造成这种情况的主要原因是多边贸易体制中缺乏竞争规则。然而，尽管世贸组织没有关于竞争的规则，但它确实规定了其他规则，例如关贸总协定第十一条关于全面消除数量限制。本文将采取法律和经济学的方法，探讨欧佩克维持的能源部门的限制性做法是否会被本文抓住。将分析欧佩克的“首选垄断市场力量工具”，即石油生产配额管理，是否属于本条的定义。为此，