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Scientific realism, or the risks of importing research models into psychology
Theory & Psychology ( IF 1.553 ) Pub Date : 2021-06-15 , DOI: 10.1177/09593543211006777
David Carré 1
Affiliation  

In “Scientific Realism and the Issue of Variability in Behavior,” Arocha (2021) develops an acute critique of “the standard model of current research practice in psychology” (p. 376), sharply dissecting five unwarranted assumptions behind it. To address these issues, the author proposes adopting a nonpositivist philosophical basis for behavioral research: scientific realism. Behind this argumentation, however, it is implied that scientific realism is fit for becoming the metatheoretical framework for psychology because it addresses the shortcomings of the current positivist model. In this commentary, I argue that scientific realism is not fit for becoming that philosophical basis, because it is open to reducing the discipline’s subject matter—the human person—to make it fit with models that have been fruitful in other sciences. Three historical examples are presented to show the risks of adopting models from disciplines devoted to explaining other phenomena to tackle the complexity of psychology’s subject matter.



中文翻译:

科学现实主义,或将研究模型导入心理学的风险

在“科学现实主义和行为可变性问题”中,Arocha(2021 年)对“当前心理学研究实践的标准模型”(第 376 页)进行了尖锐的批判,尖锐地剖析了其背后的五个毫无根据的假设。为了解决这些问题,作者建议采用非实证主义哲学基础进行行为研究:科学实在论。然而,在这种论证背后,暗示科学实在论适合成为心理学的元理论框架,因为它解决了当前实证主义模型的缺点。在这篇评论中,我认为科学实在论不是适合成为那个哲学基础,因为它可以减少学科的主题——人——使其适合在其他科学中卓有成效的模型。三个历史例子展示了采用学科模型来解释其他现象的风险,以解决心理学主题的复杂性。

更新日期:2021-06-15
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