We propose an experimental eye-tracking study to test how strategic sophistication is shaped by experience in $3\times 3$ two-person normal-form games. Although strategic sophistication has been shown to be linked to a variety of endogenous and exogenous factors, little is known about how it is affected by previous interactive decisions. We show that complete feedback in previous games can significantly enhance strategic sophistication, and that games that in principle provide equivalent learning opportunities lead instead to substantially different learning outcomes. Specifically, only repeated play with feedback of games that emphasize strategic interdependence significantly enhances strategic learning, producing an increase in the frequency of equilibrium play and a shift of attention to the incentives of the counterpart. Moreover, we find that the type of learning underlying newly gained strategic skills can vary substantially across players. Whereas some players eventually learn to visually analyze the payoff matrix consistently with equilibrium reasoning, others appear to use experience with previous interactions to devise simple heuristics of play. Our results have implications for theoretical and computational modeling of learning.

我们提出了一项实验性眼动追踪研究，以测试战略复杂性如何通过经验塑造 $3\times 3$两人正常形式的游戏。尽管已证明战略复杂性与各种内生和外生因素有关，但对其如何受先前交互决策的影响知之甚少。我们表明，以前游戏中的完整反馈可以显着提高战略复杂度，而原则上提供同等学习机会的游戏会导致截然不同的学习结果。具体来说，只有重复玩强调战略相互依赖的游戏反馈才能显着增强战略学习，增加均衡游戏的频率，并将注意力转移到对手的激励上。此外，我们发现新获得的战略技能背后的学习类型可能因玩家而异。一些玩家最终学会以均衡推理一致地对收益矩阵进行可视化分析，而其他玩家似乎使用先前交互的经验来设计简单的游戏启发式。我们的结果对学习的理论和计算模型具有影响。