Using a game-theoretic approach, the benefits of macroprudential policy coordination are evaluated in a two-country model of a currency union with financial frictions. The gains from coordination are measured by comparing outcomes under a centralized regime, where a common regulator sets a macroprudential tax on loans to maximize union-wide welfare, and a decentralized regime, where each regulator sets the tax independently to maximize own-country welfare. Numerical experiments show that, in response to financial shocks, coordination involves increased activism in the country where the shock originates (keeping one’s house in order). However, while union-wide gains from coordination are positive when country-specific instrument rules are set, a one-size-fits-all policy makes the union worse off when member countries are asymmetric in size and structure. Under both the centralized and the decentralized regimes, getting monetary policy to lean aggressively against the financial cycle may be suboptimal. The broad implications of the analysis for macroprudential policy coordination and the central bank’s mandate in the euro area are also discussed.

使用博弈论方法，在具有金融摩擦的货币联盟的两国模型中评估宏观审慎政策协调的好处。协调的收益是通过比较集中制度下的结果来衡量的，在集中制度下，共同监管机构对贷款征收宏观审慎税，以最大限度地提高工会范围的福利，而在分散制度下，每个监管机构独立设置税收，以最大限度地提高本国福利。数值实验表明，为了应对金融冲击，协调涉及在冲击发生的国家增加积极性（保持家中秩序）。然而，虽然当制定特定国家的文书规则时，工会范围内的协调收益是积极的，但一刀切当成员国的规模和结构不对称时，政策会使联盟变得更糟。在中心化和去中心化体制下，让货币政策积极应对金融周期可能不是最佳选择。还讨论了分析对宏观审慎政策协调和中央银行在欧元区的职责的广泛影响。