ABSTRACT

Although in recent years Christine Ladd-Franklin has received recognition for her contributions to logic and psychology, her role in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century philosophy, as well as her relationship with American pragmatism, has yet to be fully appreciated. My goal here is to attempt to better understand Ladd-Franklin’s place in the pragmatist tradition by drawing attention to her work on the nature and unity of the proposition. The question concerning the unity of the proposition – namely, the problem of how to determine what differentiates a mere collection of terms from a unified and meaningful proposition – received substantial attention in Ladd-Franklin’s time, and would continue to interest analytic philosophers well into the twentieth century. I argue that Ladd-Franklin had a distinct theory of the proposition and solution to the problem of the unity of the proposition that she developed over the course of her writings on logic and philosophy. In spelling out her views, I will also show her work interacted with and influenced that of the pragmatist who was her greatest influence, C.S. Peirce.

摘要

尽管近年来克里斯汀·拉德-富兰克林因其对逻辑学和心理学的贡献而受到认可，但她在 19 世纪末和 20 世纪初哲学中的作用以及她与美国实用主义的关系尚未得到充分认识。我在这里的目标是通过引起人们对她关于命题本质和统一性的工作的关注，试图更好地理解拉德-富兰克林在实用主义传统中的地位。关于命题的统一性的问题——即如何确定是什么将单纯的术语集合与统一且有意义的命题区分开来的问题——在拉德-富兰克林时代受到了极大的关注，并将继续使分析哲学家对二十世纪。我认为拉德-富兰克林有一个独特的命题理论和解决命题统一性问题的方法，这是她在逻辑和哲学著作的过程中发展起来的。在阐述她的观点时，我还将展示她的作品与对她影响最大的实用主义者 CS Peirce 的互动和影响。