ABSTRACT

Can we treat people in a discriminatory way in virtue of how we think about them? In this essay, I argue that the answer is yes. According to the constitutive claim, stereotyping constitutes discrimination, either sometimes or always. This essay defends the constitutive claim and explores the deeper justifications for it. I also sketch the constitutive claim’s larger ethical significance. One upshot is that we can wrongfully discriminate against (or in favor of) others in thought, even if we keep our views of others to ourselves. Second, if stereotyping is a form of discrimination, theories of wrongful discrimination bear on the ethical questions associated with stereotyping, including this one: under what conditions is it wrong to stereotype? In closing, I introduce an intriguing possibility, namely, that stereotyping is wrong if and when it constitutes wrongful discrimination.

摘要

我们能不能因为我们对他们的看法而以歧视的方式对待他们？在这篇文章中，我认为答案是肯定的。根据构成性权利要求，刻板印象有时或总是构成歧视。本文为构成性主张辩护并探讨其更深层次的理由。我还勾勒出构成性主张更大的伦理意义。一个结果是，我们可能会在思想上错误地歧视（或支持）他人，即使我们对他人保持自己的看法。其次，如果刻板印象是一种歧视形式，那么错误歧视理论涉及与刻板印象相关的伦理问题，包括：在什么情况下刻板印象是错误的？最后，我介绍一种有趣的可能性，即，如果陈规定型观念构成不当歧视，那么它就是错误的。