This article examines the collective bargaining efforts of atomized fishermen with a monopsony-like buying sector. Government allocation of collective share quotas to fishermen’s organizations triggered the voluntary formation of cooperative fishermen’s bargaining associations, while a highly concentrated processing sector started behaving as a countervailing monopsony. This drove ex-vessel price determination into region-specific bilateral monopoly price bargaining. We estimate an empirical model of regional ex-vessel price determination, taking advantage of between-region regulatory differences to identify the differential effects on ex-vessel prices. Our model estimates the overall impact on regional ex-vessel prices from this process of institutional change. Our results show evidence of higher, policy-shift driven, ex-vessel prices at only one of the regions studied. This region had more favorable conditions for collective action and is where fishermen were able to achieve more stable, better organized fishermen’s associations.

中文翻译：

---

集体份额配额和渔民组织在离船价格确定中的作用

本文考察了具有垄断性购买部门的雾化渔民的集体谈判努力。政府将集体份额配额分配给渔民组织引发了合作渔民谈判协会的自愿组建，而高度集中的加工部门开始表现为反补贴垄断。这将船前价格的确定推向了特定区域的双边垄断价格谈判。我们估计了区域离岸价格确定的经验模型，利用区域间监管差异来识别对离岸价格的不同影响。我们的模型估计了这一制度变迁过程对区域离岸价格的总体影响。我们的结果显示了更高的证据，政策转变驱动，仅在所研究的地区之一的前船价格。该地区为集体行动提供了更有利的条件，是渔民能够建立更稳定、更有组织的渔民协会的地方。