The paper examines the distributive and collective effects of the United Nations (UN) reform proposal by the Group of Four (G4) which envisions a 25-member Security Council with four additional non-permanent and six additional permanent members. Academic scholars and affected states have argued that adding more (veto) players to the Council would reduce the voting power of the five current permanent members (P5) and undermine the effectiveness of the body as a whole. Projecting General Assembly voting records of current and proposed permanent members from 1991 to 2017 onto an enlarged Security Council, our analysis suggests that the chance to pass a favorable resolution increases for most P5 members and that in most scenarios such a Council would pass not less but more resolutions. This should be of interest to UN members, and G4 countries in particular, as it allows them to argue more forcefully for the implementation of their proposal.

中文翻译：

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将大会投票记录投射到扩大后的安理会：对 G4 改革提案的分析

该文件审查了联合国 (UN) 四国集团 (G4) 改革提案的分配和集体影响，该提案设想了一个由 25 个成员组成的安全理事会，以及四个额外的非常任理事国和六个额外的常任理事国。学术学者和受影响的国家认为，向理事会增加更多（否决权）成员会降低五个现任常任理事国（P5）的投票权，并削弱整个机构的有效性。将 1991 年至 2017 年现任和拟议常任理事国的大会投票记录投射到扩大后的安理会，我们的分析表明，大多数五常成员通过有利决议的机会增加，并且在大多数情况下，这样的安理会通过更多的决议。这应该是联合国成员感兴趣的，