Abstract

The nuclear sector finds itself at a critical juncture, in part because recent large nuclear power plant projects in Europe and the United States have suffered from what some scholars have called megaproject “pathologies,” that is, the chronic failure of large, complex infrastructure projects to fulfill the “iron triangle” criteria of project performance: cost, timetable, and predefined project prescriptions. To explore the framings of such problems within the nuclear community, this paper analyzes the ways in which 19 experts at the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), under the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) diagnose such problems and their underlying causes. The analysis draws on framing theory and on the scholarship on megaprojects, with semistructured interviews providing the empirical material.

The identified four frames highlight as key explanations for pathologies the “vicious circle” of lacking investment, erosion of skills, and construction problems; “bureaucratization and contractualization”; “broken markets”; and “complexity and nuclear-sector exceptionality.” Two overarching metaframes attribute the ultimate reasons to factors outside the projects and the nuclear community, notably to the lack of political leadership and the inability of the modern Western society to identify and pursue its own interest. The NEA frames bear significant resemblance to the alternative megaproject literature, which calls into question the very notion of pathology; stresses the complex, open systems character of megaprojects; and calls for flexibility and adaptability to better align megaprojects with their evolving context. However, the vital need to ensure and maintain an appropriate fit between nuclear-sector megaprojects and their ever-evolving environment deserves greater attention. Toward this end, introduction of OECD-style country peer reviews could constitute an opportunity toward collective “frame reflection,” in interaction with communities offering competing framings of the pathologies. Further research would be welcome on the role of the NEA in framing processes within the nuclear community and on the relationships between megaprojects and modernity in this high-risk industry.

摘要

核行业发现自己处于关键时刻，部分原因是欧洲和美国最近的大型核电站项目遭受了一些学者称之为大型项目“病态”的影响，即大型复杂基础设施项目的长期失败满足项目绩效的“铁三角”标准：成本、时间表和预定义的项目处方。为了探索核界内此类问题的框架，本文分析了经济合作与发展组织 (OECD) 下属的核能机构 (NEA) 的 19 位专家诊断此类问题的方式及其根本原因. 分析借鉴了框架理论和大型项目的学术研究，半结构化访谈提供了经验材料。

确定的四个框架突出了缺乏投资、技能侵蚀和建设问题的“恶性循环”，作为病理的关键解释；“官僚化和契约化”；“破碎的市场”；和“复杂性和核部门的特殊性”。两个总体元框架将最终原因归咎于项目和核社区之外的因素，特别是缺乏政治领导以及现代西方社会无法确定和追求自己的利益。NEA 框架与替代的大型项目文献非常相似，这对病理学的概念提出了质疑；强调大型项目复杂、开放的系统特征；并呼吁灵活性和适应性更好地使大型项目与其不断发展的环境保持一致。然而，确保和保持核部门大型项目与其不断变化的环境之间适当匹配的迫切需要值得更多关注。为此，在与提供竞争性病理框架的社区互动的过程中，引入 OECD 式的国家同行评审可以构成集体“框架反思”的机会。欢迎进一步研究 NEA 在核界内制定过程中的作用，以及在这个高风险行业中大型项目与现代性之间的关系。”与提供竞争性病理框架的社区互动。欢迎进一步研究 NEA 在核界内制定过程中的作用，以及在这个高风险行业中大型项目与现代性之间的关系。”与提供竞争性病理框架的社区互动。欢迎进一步研究 NEA 在核界内制定过程中的作用，以及在这个高风险行业中大型项目与现代性之间的关系。